the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).
9 Some of these provisions suggest that the holding of periodic and genuine elections is the main way the right to participate in government may be enjoyed. The ECHR Protocol, for example, requires states to hold "free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot."
Article 21(3) of the UDHR is equally emphatic that:
The will of the people …shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.
The essentials of free and fair elections as a prerequisite for democratic governance cannot be over-emphasised. Elections enable citizens to participate in their government.
However, as Nzongola-Ntalaja correctly argued, it would be too simplistic to identify democratic governance with the holding of elections. 10 Rather, the question of democratic governance goes beyond elections to the realisation of democratic principles of governance and to the balance of social forces in the community.
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In this regard, it would be detrimental to confine the meaning and scope of the right to participate in government within the narrow parameters of political participation, or worse still, the holding of periodic and genuine elections. This right is quite broad and envisages various facets which link up to form the requisite framework for the realisation of the rights of all individuals who reside within a country. Simply put, the right serves as an important bridge between three key elements that define the benchmark of good governance in any civilised society-the rule of law, democracy and human rights. 
5
It is imperative to note that governance relates to the manner in which responsibility is discharged. 12 In the public domain, such responsibility may be acquired through, inter alia, election, appointment or delegation. Therefore, good governance should be understood to mean the process where such responsibility is discharged in an effective, transparent, and accountable manner. 13 By extension, it entails the establishment of efficient and accountable institutions-whether political, judicial, administrative or economic-that would promote, among other things, human rights, the rule of law and democracy. Ultimately, it should ensure that people are free to participate in, and be heard on, decisions that affect their lives. In all fairness though, it is encouraging to note, the drafters intended that this right be construed beyond the limited scope of 'political participation', to envisage other relevant rights, such as equal access to public office, property and services. This is quite innovative because, as shall be elaborated below, there is a close nexus between this right and some other rights in the Charter, to the extent that the violation of the one would most certainly lead to the violation of the others. Indeed, even the jurisprudence of the African Commission confirms the foregoing observation. For instance, the Commission has emphasised the connectivity between this right and, among others, the rights to nationality, freedom of assembly and expression and self-determination. 19 It has also hinted that unconstitutional changes of government could adversely affect the enjoyment of the right to participate in government. The Commission has also emphasised the relationship between the right to nationality and the right to participate in government, although the former is not stipulated in the The Charter makes it clear that citizens should have the right to participate in the government of their country "directly or through freely chosen representatives …". The pain in such an instance is caused not just to the citizen who suffers discrimination by reason of place of origin but that the rights of the citizens of Zambia to "freely choose" political representatives of their choice, is violated. The purpose of the expression "in accordance with the provisions of the law" is surely intended to regulate how the right is to be exercised rather than that the law should be used to take away the right.
The above reasoning is very pertinent for two reasons. First, the Commission establishes an important principle to the effect that, the imposition of exclusionary bars with the intention to check political opposition affects both the discriminated individual and the people he or she intends to represent in accordance with Article 13(1). Secondly, the Commission's pronouncements serve a warning to those governments that are fond of using their legal systems and other state machinery to frustrate a section of their citizenry. The origin of Kenya's constitutional order has closely been linked with the declaration of the British East Africa Protectorate of 1895. 44 Prior to this period, the country had no formal legal system or government as recognised today. However, like every other precolonial African society, the traditional communities that lived in the territory, now called Kenya, had peculiar forms of socio-political arrangements that could loosely be termed as 'government'. 45 Although these communities differed in a number of ways, there is ample evidence to the effect that most of them gave credence to human rights, especially 'participatory rights'. 46 It cannot be disputed, however, there were certain barbaric practices in these societies, which could lead one to presume the absence of human rights, or even law. This state of affairs was nevertheless not unique to pre-colonial Kenya as human rights violations were a common feature in all human societies the world over.
Before we examine the emergence of Kenya's constitutional order, it is imperative to point out that prior to foreign intrusion, the subsisting traditional societies were mainly governed by customary law and traditions. Despite the fact that Africans constituted the most predominant racial group in Kenya, only 'whites' were until then permitted to participate in the administration of the country.
Indeed, it is unfortunate that Africans were not appointed to the Legco and very disappointing that all appointments were made by the Governor in total disregard of the peoples' right to choose their representatives. The idea of the Governor 'hand-picking' members of the Legco did not auger well with both African's and Europeans. Kenya an African territory in which the interests of the 'natives' would reign supreme.
Through the paper, the British government was to exercise trusteeship over the colony, the objective of the trust being to protect and advance the interests of Africans. was strongly based on the principles of parliamentary government and the protection of minorities. 74 The nature and content of this Constitution was largely influenced by the then prevailing political circumstances.
To begin with, awareness that the colonial authorities were about to relinquish governance to Kenyans sparked off acrimonious debate on the modalities of distributing political power among the subsisting political parties. At that time, the country's politics were dominated by KADU and KANU. KANU was essentially an alliance between politicians from Central and Nyanza Provinces, and a staunch proponent of a centralised system of government. 75 KADU, on the other hand, represented the interests of numerically and politically weaker ethnic groups and expressed, among other things, its preference for a federal system of government. Its insistence on this system of government was motivated by the need to consolidate the weaker economic and numeric bargaining power of its supporters. 76 KANU was disinterested in such a system because it had much to gain from centralised control of economic and political resources courtesy of its numerical strength. 77 The political differences between the two parties, however, were resolved when their leaders decided to merge them in 1964.
Another factor that influenced the nature and content of the Independence Constitution was the minorities' desire for self-preservation. KADU, protection of minorities and the control of the exercise of political power. 79 The interplay between these factors resulted in the establishment of a weaker form of government than that of the colonial administration.
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All the same, the emergence of the independent state revived the hopes and aspirations of the African masses, which were at the time impoverished and taken aback by the brutish colonial legacy. This was especially because political power had passed from the hands of colonialists to indigenous leaders who were expected to understand and appreciate the problems of their people. It was equally expected that the 'lost glory' and traditional values that were undermined by colonialism would be restored, of course with some reforms that would accommodate the socio-economic and political diversity of the country. This, however, turned out not to be the case. Instead, the emerging state adopted a Constitution and legal system similar to that of her former coloniser, notwithstanding the fact that the new Constitution could not adequately redress the woes of the people.
The Constitution came with a flowery package of guarantees, including a multiparty system of government, independence of the judiciary, rule of law, and protection of human rights. 81 It however failed to entrench certain crucial rights which now pose a threat to national unity. Whereas the document contains a Bill of Rights that guarantees the traditional civil and political rights as set out in the UDHR, it does not expressly guarantee the right to participate in government. The Bill of Rights, therefore, cannot be said to be representative of a set of higher values emanating from, and subscribed to, by the Kenyan people. Rather, it was meant to be nothing more than a bulwark against political power in the hands of 'natives', primarily to protect the interests of European settlers. It is ironical to note that, while the pre-independence struggle was informed by the desire for Africans to have greater participation in government, the same was not entrenched in the Independence Constitution. It would be pretentious to suggest that the provisions relating to freedom from discrimination under section 82 of the Constitution are sufficient to protect the right to participate in government. 83 Likewise, it would be gullible to believe that sections 34, 35 and 43, which regulate the election of Members of Parliament and the registration of voters, guarantee this right. The only provision that comes close to guaranteeing the enjoyment of this right is section 75, which protects individuals from the deprivation of property. 84 But unlike Article 13(3) of the African Charter, this provision 83 Section 82 of the Constitution partly provides as follows: "1. Subject to subsections (4), (5) and (8), no law shall make any provision that is discriminatory either of itself or in its effect; 2. Subject to subsections (6), (8) and (9), no person shall be treated in a discriminatory manner by a person acting by virtue of any written law or in the performance of the functions of a public office or a public authority; 3. In this section the expression "discriminatory" means affording different treatment to different persons attributable wholly or mainly to their respective descriptions by race, tribe, place of origin or residence or other local connection, political opinions, colour, creed or sex whereby persons of one such description are subjected to disabilities or restrictions to which persons of another such description are not made subject or are accorded privileges or advantages which are not accorded to persons of another such description …; 7.
Subject to subsection (8), no person shall be treated in a discriminatory manner in respect of access to shops, hotels, lodging-houses, public restaurants, eating houses, beer halls or places of public entertainment or in respect of access to places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of public funds or dedicated to the use of the general public; 8. Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this section to the extent that the law in question makes provision whereby persons of a description mentioned in, subsection (3) may be subjected to a is concerned more with guaranteeing the right to property than with ensuring equality of access to public property.
Under the prevailing state of affairs, one would definitely agree with Odinkalu's argument that the situation in post-colonial Africa necessitated a re-orientation of states away from the institutional infrastructure and attitudinal orientation inherited from the colonial period. 85 This process, however, was never undertaken let alone achieved. In fact, in some countries, such as Kenya, most of the archaic laws, institutions and attitudes that underwrote colonialism did not just survive independence; they prospered thereafter.
The consequences of failing to entrench the right to participate in government in Kenya's constitutional order have been severe. This is evidenced by the fact that since independence, Kenyans have been subjected to political regimes that have sought to implement democracy and human rights within the context of violence, intimidation, corruption and a general lack of transparency and accountability. Such a context has encouraged continued plundering of public resources and abuse of state institutions.
Again, the country has found it exceptionally difficult to manage the conflicts arising from its ethnic diversity. Indisputably, the country's multi-ethnicity, coupled with its weak constitutional framework, has contributed to its fluid national identities. This partly explains why ethnocentrism is one of the key challenges to the realisation of national unity and integration. What follows is a detailed discussion on some of the issues highlighted here.
The causes and effects of the 'politics of exclusion' in Kenya
Compared with her neighbours, who are in a perpetual state of civil unrest, Kenya has for long been a hub of socio-economic and political stability. However, in spite of its success in containing an outbreak of civil war, the country is still largely plagued with many of the factors that undermine citizens' participation in government. These factors include strong ethnic divisions, polarised politics, political manipulation, socio-economic disparities, deepening levels of poverty and endemic corruption. 86 The factors are examined below in detail under four major themes, namely, socio-historical, ethnopolitical, socio-economic and legislative factors.
Socio-historical factors
A number of socio-historical factors have contributed to the undermining of the right to participate in government in Kenya. In the main, colonialism perpetuated and subsequently left behind an undesirable legacy on inter-communal interactions in the country in that, the notion of statehood was imposed on communities that historically lacked inter-communal coherence. By forcing ethnic communities that previously lived independently of each other to live together, the British colonisers did not give a thought to the possibility of the emerging state being ethnically polarised.
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Further, through its policies that favoured the investment of resources in only high potential areas that had ample rainfall and fertile lands, colonialism spawned asymmetrical development in Kenya. 88 The colonial government focussed on developing infrastructure and social services in 'productive' areas at the expense of the rest of the country, and this inequality remains largely unaddressed in the policies or practices of independent Kenya. 89 Indeed, soon after independence, the government reiterated the colonial position that public resources would only be invested in areas where they would earn the highest return. 90 Consequently, regional inequalities between Nairobi, the former 'white highlands', Coastal, Northeast and Western provinces are still evident today. The resultant disconnection between the various ethnic communities and regions of the country has provided the ethno-regionalised basis for political and economic discrimination of some citizens. It is rather unfortunate that this trend has found support from a class of post-colonial political elite, who prefer it, both as a bargaining chip to bolster their political influence and as a tool to lock out of government their perceived opponents. Although successive post-colonial governments were expected to dispel the problems that had been evolved by the colonial legacy, this has gone largely unaddressed.
For various reasons, the political class in successive governments opted to entertain and nurture these inequalities. It is therefore not surprising that the underlying regional imbalances and the attendant inter-ethnic inequalities easily inform the persistent struggles over the country's resources such as land, and access to public services. This socio-historical reality has had a negative effect on democracy and human rights, and in particular the realisation of the right to participate in government.
Ethno-political factors
Since independence, Kenya's political system has demonstrated overt weaknesses and inherent inequities that have had significant ramifications for citizenship rights. It is important to note that Kenya, like many other African countries, has been guilty of deliberately defining citizenship within the narrow prism of ethnic belonging.
Consequently, one of the most acute problems the country has been facing is the endless struggle to integrate its different communities into a democratic modern nation, without compromising their respective ethnic identities. Generally, ethnocentrism has had manifold implications: one, it has encouraged the politicisation and manipulation of ethnic identities to extreme measures and two, it has led to the exclusion of some communities from government affairs. 92 A few illustrations need to be given to unravel the magnitude of these problems.
During the reign of the country's first President, Jomo Kenyatta, a small elite group called 'Kiambu Mafia', dominated Kenya's politics, resulting in the emergence of a class of capitalists from his Kikuyu tribe. 93 This class enjoyed unlimited economic prosperity and political influence and repressed any resistance against it. As a result, other ethnic groups as well as many non-conforming members of the Kikuyu tribe were alienated from government affairs. 94 Participation in government was somehow a preserve for those who either belonged to the president's tribe or were his pledged loyalists.
His pledge notwithstanding, Moi soon became so engrossed in suppressing his perceived opponents. Corruption, ethnicity and human rights became his distant concerns as he began to centralise and personalise power. 97 This he achieved through tactics such as populating the civil service and state-owned institutions with members of his tribe. 98 He also criminalised competitive politics and criticism of his leadership.
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In order to secure the interests of their respective ethnic communities, both Kenyatta and
Moi therefore resorted to political gerrymandering, which at best fettered the right to participate in government. One such ways was to limit the country's democratic space by allowing only one political party-the Kenya African National Union (KANU)-to operate freely. The party soon became the 'mama na baba' (Swahili phrase for 'father and mother') of the nation, wielding the ultimate political authority in the land. Sadly, though, KANU was under the effective control of the sitting president, who also sanctioned the appointment of its members and officials. In effect, there was no clear demarcation between party and state authority. Thus, for one to participate in government, in whatever capacity, he or she had to be a professed convert of political sycophancy. At the same time, political power was personalised through unilateral constitutional and legislative amendments. By 1991, for example, the country's Constitution had been amended about 32 times in order to afford more comfort and power to the incumbent presidents, their tribe-mates and cronies. Among the amendments was the insertion of Section 2A, which made Kenya a de jure one party state until that provision was repealed in 1991.
Generally, Kenya's ethno-politics have led to the misplaced assumption that it is essential for one's ethnic community to win the presidency in order to have unrestricted access to 97 Korwa, A & Munyae, I (note 93 above). 98 As above. state resources, office and services. 100 Hence, governmental authority, particularly the presidency, is perceived, more or less, as the preserve of the person in office and his tribe-mates, and could therefore be abused without any serious repercussions. This explains why every tribe in the country covets the presidency, and why losing it is so costly and therefore unacceptable. It is also understandable why, since the re-introduction of multi-party politics in 1991, the country's political parties are mainly regional, ethnicbased and poorly institutionalised. The nature and composition of the political parties founded in 1992 and thereafter attest to this fact in that, even the self-styled 'national parties' have tribal or regional undercurrents.
It is disturbing to note that even the re-introduction of multi-party politics in the country did not fully ensure citizen participation in government. When Kenya entered the multiparty era, there was an earnest expectation that the government would create an enabling environment for its citizens to exercise freely their constitutionally guaranteed rights.
Contrary to this popular expectation, most of the 1990s were a continuation of the undemocratic practices birthed at independence. In the early 1990s, for example, the KANU government went as far as instigating ethnic-based violence in order to portray that a multiparty political system was not suitable for a multi-ethnic country like Kenya. 101 It was during this period when 'ethnic cleansing' occurred in many parts of the country, aimed at expelling certain communities from areas believed to be the 'native reserves' of other communities. This happened in, for example, the Rift Valley Province between 1991 and 1993 when the Kalenjin community attempted to expel other communities living in the area. 102 The same could be said of the violence reported in parts of Coast Province prior to and after the 1997 General Elections. There is ample evident that the 1992 and 1997 ethnic violence was politically motivated by the government.
Specifically, a report compiled by the Amnesty International, implicated certain progovernment politicians with the 1997 clashes in Coast Province.
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It may be argued that Kenya's third multi-party elections, held in December 2002, presented the best opportunity for the realisation of an ethnically integrated country. This is mainly because for once, ethnicity was at its barest minimum, courtesy of the formation of an inter-ethnic party called the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). This opportunity was nonetheless lost as NARC's promise to end ethnicity was forgotten the moment Kibaki was sworn in as the country's third president. Like his predecessors,
Kibaki is roundly accused of perpetrating ethnicity.
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It is rather unfortunate that the ethnic factor in Kenya's politics has often been dismissed, overlooked and considered secondary, while it is one of the staunchest challenges to citizens' participation in government. Rothchild rightly warned against such an attitude by emphasising that "as long as observers cavalierly dismiss ethnicity as an irrational relic of the past, they will be unable to recognise its force and attraction in contemporary Despite noticeable progress in key socio-economic reforms, the country still faces many challenges which have negative implications on citizens' participation in government.
These challenges concern, inter alia, improving the efficiency of public sector service delivery; building new infrastructure and rehabilitating existing ones; high unemployment rates especially among the youth; poverty eradication; maintaining sound three arms of government-executive, legislature and judiciary; land acquisition and distribution; reform of the electoral system; and improving ethnic integration.
Good governance is influenced by the existence of a sound democratic Constitution that enables the government to manage the affairs of the state effectively, while at the same time empowering the citizenry to participate in government. 120 Unfortunately, Kenya's current Constitution was written without much input from the citizens, and in spite of relentless efforts to amend it, there is consensus that the document is now outmoded. 121 In fact, some of the amendments eventually undermined the legal sanctity of the document, rendering it more as a powerful tool in the hands of the executive than an agreement between the government and its citizens. A closer look at some of its provisions would confirm this position. Executive interference in appointments to the Judiciary, do not conform to the accepted norms of democracy and are a source of disquiet in certain segments of Kenyan society.
The traditional democratic notion of checks and balances is seen as a safety net that can best ensure that government organs work in a perfect equilibrium to deliver to the citizen an acceptable governance package.
Democracy, strictly so called, has therefore not been tenable in Kenya, much due to an 'authoritarian Constitution' that vests enormous powers on the presidency. Constitutional reform has been a central talking point for decades, but to date every attempt to realise this goal is deliberately suppressed. The first major attempt towards comprehensive constitutional reforms was in 1998, when the Constitution of Kenya Review Act was enacted to provide the framework for substantial review. Other than allowing the constitutional reform process to be the forum for all Kenyans to collectively determine the destiny of their nation, politicians and other people with sectarian interests have always usurped the process to settle their scores. It is needless to emphasise, through comprehensive constitutional and legislative reforms, sound democratic principles can be entrenched in a multi-ethnic country like Kenya. Ultimately, this will present to every citizen the opportunity to participate in government.
Conclusion
Although Kenya's constitutional order does not sufficiently guarantee citizens the right to Thirdly, the system should strengthen legislative and administrative institutions, such as Parliament, the Judiciary and other state institutions. Fourthly, it should empower citizens to hold public officials accountable for their conduct, omissions, and decisions. Fifthly, it should ensure effective public sector management, stable economic policies, effective resource mobilisation and efficient use of public resources. Lastly, it should adhere to the rule of law in a manner that would protect human rights and democracy and ensure equal access to justice for all.
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